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The COVID-19 pandemic is testing the societies of the world’s most unequal 
continent, where many depend on informal work for their livelihood. Social-
distancing measures directly affect their livelihoods, and make immediate 
social assistance imperative. The crisis is also testing political leadership, 
as some presidents are emerging as strong, unifying leaders, while others 
flounder, in a continent where historically trust in formal institutions is low. 
 • Decisive leadership has proven crucial for implementing wide-ranging lock-
downs, and for the immediate commitment to social assistance. The presidents 
of Argentina and Peru stand out as examples of fast and coordinated responses. 
 • The potential abuse of extraordinary powers raises concerns for the medium 
run. In Chile and Bolivia, governments struggling with legitimacy after last 
year’s massive protests have had to postpone a constitutional convention vote 
in the former and presidential elections in the latter. 
 • Many governments have quickly promised social assistance. An enormous eco-
nomic rescue package in Chile stands out for its stinginess towards the most 
vulnerable. 
 • Where populist presidents from the right (Brazil) or left (Mexico) deny the 
ser iousness of the pandemic, subnational and other authorities seek to fill the 
leadership vacuum – but policy implementation is harmed. The heaviest price 
will be paid by the most vulnerable.  
 • Latin America will suffer from post-crisis external shocks. With little aid com-
ing from the United States or Europe, China emerges as a key hope for ship-
ments of face masks, test kits, and protective gear. 
Policy Implications
As COVID spreads – with higher or flatter curves – health systems will strug-
gle to treat the severely affected. Lockdowns will be differentially respected, 
as promises of emergency social assistance need to be immediately delivered. 
Where the executive uses the moment at hand for narrow political gains, sharp 
political conflict is likely to ensue. Multilateral initiatives to secure social protec-
tion for vulnerable households in the region are needed. 
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The COVID-19 pandemic is testing the socio-economic fabric and political leader-
ship of all Latin American countries. In the world’s most unequal region, many of 
the poor depend on informal work for their daily livelihood. The social-distancing 
measures that are necessary to fight the virus directly affect the economic liveli-
hoods of about half the region’s population who work in the informal sector in ser-
vices and petty commerce, and who do not have assets or savings to carry them 
through the crisis. All this makes immediate social assistance measures imperative. 
Unfortunately, the list of risks is more extensive than that. In times of crisis, 
executive authorities occupy the central stage, people’s expectations for decisive 
government action increase, and there is higher tolerance for power concentra-
tion and constraints on people’s rights. This is especially the case with the current 
public health emergency that requires strong measures to limit social interaction 
in order to decelerate the spread of the virus. In the presidential democracies of 
Latin America, with a past of strong authoritarian leaders and a present of strong 
elected executives, the pressure for executive action is as great as the dread of its ef-
fect. Presidential actions around the coronavirus crisis are being questioned – and 
feared –, but the lack of responsible presidential leadership when it is most needed 
has also proven problematic. 
This is the enormous political challenge that governments face. At the same 
time, however, the effectiveness of the social-distancing measures will in large part 
depend on whether the government ensures basic subsistence to the vulnerable so 
that they can stay inside and not spread the disease. This is the enormous social 
challenge that Latin American leaders and societies face. We discuss both in turn, 
and then reflect on the economic and geopolitical implications of the crisis beyond 
the immediate health emergency unfolding. 
A Test of Leadership  
On the one hand, the mobilisation of the state’s repressive apparatus raises ser-
ious concerns. Where the state has historically shown a weak capacity to guarantee 
health and sanitary conditions that are fair to everyone, it has instead been less 
hesitant to mobilise the police and military in the name of order and security. As the 
coronavirus progresses, countries have implemented increasingly restrictive meas-
ures on the movement and assembly of people. The imposition of curfews – such 
as in Chile, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, and Honduras – and 
other constraining measures that force people to quarantine – such as in Argentina, 
Bolivia, Colombia, El Salvador, and Uruguay – are justified by the need to curve the 
spread of the contagious disease. However, they also raise concerns about the abuse 
of extraordinary powers for narrow political motives, or for their perpetuation over 
time beyond the current health crisis. 
The severity of the measures taken by Latin American governments is also a 
response to the long tradition of low rule compliance. For example, in Bolivia in-
terim president Jeanine Áñez, after postponing pending elections, declared a health 
emergency on March 26 in response to what she considered unacceptably low com-
pliance with the quarantine requirements, allowing for military involvement and 
prison sentences of up to 10 years for infractors. But Áñez’s judicial persecution of 
supporters of the toppled government make those in the opposition wary of how 
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she will use the state of emergency. Involving the police and especially the mili-
tary in enforcement measures such as street patrols may have long term costs for 
dem ocracy, as it builds on the already-existing warning signs of increasing military 
presence in the continent’s both public and political life (Scharpf 2020; for keeping 
track of the evolving state of emergency decrees in Latin America and globally, see: 
www.icnl.org/covid19tracker). 
Add to this the fallout from last year’s political instability. Bolivia and Chile are 
cases in point here. In the first, massive protests exploded last fall, which eventu-
ally toppled the government of left-wing Evo Morales, the institution of the above-
mentioned interim right-wing government, and an all-party agreement for new 
elections this May. In Chile, meanwhile, massive street protests against President 
Sebastián Piñera resulted in a vote for convening a new constitution, planned for 
this April. In both cases, the pandemic now requires these votes to be postponed. 
While in Chile there was vast support for the measures taken (Castiglioni 2020) and 
a new date has been fixed for next October, in Bolivia the tenuous constitutionality 
of the current government and indefinite postponement send an ambiguous mes-
sage. However, it should be noted that Morales and his party have endorsed the 
postponement.
In Venezuela, the Nicolás Maduro government grounded flights and sent the 
country into lockdown early on. The desperate economic situation and deteriorated 
healthcare system leave the country ill-prepared to face the crisis, and the collapse 
of the world-market price for oil only adds to the bleak perspective for Venezuela. 
The opposition leader Juan Guaidó –recognised by many Western governments as 
Venezuela’s rightful president – has called for an “emergency government” formed 
of both opposition and (unspecified) members of the governing party, but exclud-
ing Maduro. However, given that the U.S. Department of Justice indicted President 
Maduro and other Venezuelan officials on narco-terrorism conspiracy charges on 
March 29, a negotiated solution seems unlikely. Rather, the Maduro government 
may dig trenches deeper – even if this means exacerbating the country’s humanitar-
ian crisis.
All across Latin America, civic activists and law scholars have vocally warned 
society that governments should be transparent in sharing information on the ex-
tent of the crisis, civil society groups should be consulted on the adequacy of meas-
ures before implementation, and restrictions should be lifted as soon as threats 
posed by the virus diminish (Gargarella 2020). That said, tough protective meas-
ures are popu lar when combined with perceived honesty and integrity – with people 
looking for strong leadership in times of crisis. Both President Alberto Fernández 
of Argentina and President Martín Vizcarra of Peru have emerged as regional ex-
emplars in communicating transparently and decisively. Fernández first gathered 
medical advice and then summoned the support of political opponents. As Argenti-
na responded to the crisis quickly and bluntly, the president’s attitude was regarded 
as reasonable and responsible. Opinion polls in Peru showed overwhelming support 
for President Vizcarra’s handling of the crisis, including some 96 per cent approval 
of the curfew and 95 per cent support for the national quarantine (La República 
2020). Perhaps his decidedly non-populist path to the presidency – an engineer 
by training, he assumed the reins of government when the previous president was 
impeached – has something to do with this. 
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The charismatic president of El Salvador, Nayib Bukele, has also gained respect 
by getting in front of the pandemic; he early on announced a comprehensive emer-
gency plan to address COVID-19. In a country racked with high levels of violence, 
corruption, and a weak economy, he not only decreed a complete quarantine for one 
month but also put forwards an ambitious plan of social assistance to the majority 
of Salvadorans who work in the informal sector.  
On the other hand, the lack of decisive leadership in times of crisis can do great 
harm. The presidents of the two most populous countries in the region, right-wing 
Jair Bolsonaro of Brazil and left-wing Andrés Manuel López Obrador – AMLO for 
short – of Mexico, responded in the same way that they have governed: namely, 
with populist platitudes (AMLO from the left; Bolsonaro from the right), and by 
denying and ignoring inconvenient evidence. In the days prior to March 27, when 
AMLO belatedly heeded the advice of Mexican health and scientific organisations 
and members of his government and so finally recommended people stay home, he 
showcased a religious amulet when asked how he protects himself against the virus; 
like Bolsonaro, he also shared videos on social media showing his continued hug-
ging and kissing of supporters. 
Denialist strategies, likely driven by the desire to avoid blame for the economic 
ramifications of lockdowns, have been costly for these two leaders in terms of both 
popular and institutional support. Bolsonaro compared COVID-19 to a little cold 
and stated that the remedy should not be worse than the illness. He has repeatedly 
criticised the closure of schools and shops as part of the fight against the pandemic, 
lashing out at the press, the opposition, and local authorities. The president, who is 
known for his disrespect for both democratic institutions and scientific knowledge 
as well as for his extreme-right ideology, has included religious gatherings as part of 
the services regarded as essential in a decree regulating social-distancing measures 
in Brazil. His chaotic governance style (for example, issuing an executive decree 
only to revoke it less than a day later amid social media criticism) has drained the 
government of the little legitimacy it had, and mobilised the opposition to act in 
unison to confront the seriousness of the pandemic.
This political gamble is a high-stakes one for Bolsonaro, whose popularity is 
eroding particularly among his traditional support base: namely, the richest and 
most educated (Gielow 2020). In a matter of days, opposition politicians, promi-
nent economists, and the leaders of 150 civil society organisations came together 
and managed to get a basic income bill unanimously approved in Congress, soundly 
defeating the government’s own proposal. The bill now awaits sanction by the presi-
dent. Bolsonaro’s bluster has also led to an implicit transfer of power to subnational 
and local authorities for the implementation of urgent, anti-crisis measures. The 
president, who was already on bad terms with Congress and the Supreme Court, is 
now openly contradicted by several of his ministers and the military members of his 
government. He has even lost the support of governors, one after the other. 
In Mexico, AMLO remains more popular – although he is gradually slipping 
as well (Expansión Política 2020). To date, and perhaps because of his charismatic 
personality and stronger political backing in the states of the federation (his party 
has a majority in almost two-thirds of state-level congresses), the incoherent re-
sponse has not created the same political backlash among governors as it has in 
Brazil. 
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Avoiding Immediate Humanitarian Crises 
Strong leadership regarding quarantine measures will fast become meaningless if it 
is not accompanied by comprehensive social-assistance packages. With the imme-
diate and still-to-come economic effects, close to half the population in the region is 
facing an impending humanitarian crisis. 
While the population most vulnerable to COVID-19 from a medical point of view 
are the elderly, socially a large part of the most vulnerable are children and women 
(especially young families with children). Many countries in Europe can confront 
at least parts of the economic disruption through their welfare states, especially 
unemployment insurance, formal paid leave and sickness leave, as well as universal 
or almost-universal child allowances and pension coverage. This is not the case in 
Latin America, where most of the population lack social security coverage or other 
forms of income protection. Both Levy Yeyati and Malamud (2020) and Hausmann 
(2020) have recently noted that the “European model” to confront the crisis, with 
large-scale lockdowns, has huge human costs in countries with high informality and 
poverty. Almost half of Latin America’s economically active population gain their 
living in the informal sector, and much of this employment is concentrated in areas 
coming to a complete halt with the pandemic. In more than two-thirds of Latin 
American countries, more than two-thirds of children on average live in households 
without access to social security. Class stratification is strong: only one in ten indi-
viduals in the lowest income quintile – that is, those who would most need it – has 
access to social security compared to seven in ten in the highest income quintile 
(Blofield and Filgueira 2020). 
Given this, the extension of non-contributory cash transfers to households with 
children in the last 15 years has become a lifeline for low-income families. By 2016, 
30 cash transfer programmes had reached a total of 130 million people – about 20 
per cent of the population in the region (Cecchini and Atuesta 2017). Importantly, 
most received these transfers through non-discretionary administrative mecha-
nisms. Moreover, almost all Latin American households have gained access to elec-
tricity, drinking water, and cell phones over the last 15 years, and now depend on 
these services (ECLAC 2018). This existing infrastructure can now be mobilised to 
confront the social crisis, to put in place basic-income guarantees and to ensure 
continued access to basic utilities. 
In a region where historically the vulnerable come last, this challenge is as much 
a political one as a technical one. Governments can use their existing contributory 
and non-contributory social security programmes to extend immediate financial as-
sistance. However, there is a third group – the informal and self-employed work-
ers who have not in the past qualified or registered for government programmes, 
and their families – that must now be reached. It is worth noting that ensuring 
basic social-assistance coverage is actually quite cheap. Fernando Filgueira, a social 
policy expert, estimates the fiscal cost of guaranteeing each child in a vulnerable 
household an income up to the poverty line for three months (one estimate of the 
duration of the COVID-19 crisis): it amounts to less than 0.5 per cent of gross do-
mestic product in most countries and less than 1 per cent in all but three out of 17 
countries (Blofield and Filgueira 2020). 
We see clear differences in social assistance as well. Executive decrees in Ar-
gentina and Peru have released immediate social-assistance packages to vulnerable 
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households, both those already registered in government programmes and those 
that rely on income from the informal sector. In Argentina, the cash transfer is 
equivalent to 70 per cent of the national urban per capita poverty line in 2018; in 
Peru, to 115 per cent of its own such line. In both cases, such transfers will prevent 
destitution for the next month; the challenge will be to reach all those who need 
them (Blofield and Filgueira 2020). 
The Salvadoran president’s promises are perhaps the most ambitious. Along 
with the suspension of payments for three months for water, electricity, and the 
Internet, and a moratorium on rent and other monthly payments, Bukele has prom-
ised a cash transfer of USD 300 to 1.5 million Salvadorans (in a country of nine mil-
lion people). The government site to register opened up on March 28 and collapsed 
immediately afterwards, because, according to the president, it received five million 
hits in the first five minutes.
In Mexico, in contrast, AMLO has yet to propose basic-income guarantees as he 
has only recently come to terms with the magnitude of the pandemic. His executive 
decree allowing those in the formal sector over 65 or with a set of health conditions 
to be absent from work reaches a minimal share of the population, and his anti-
poverty strategy until last Friday (March 27) was to exhort all able-bodied individu-
als to continue to work. It may be that he will propose something in the coming 
days; however, his gutting of the public sector in the name of his anti-corruption 
initiative, alongside a politically motivated overhaul of the existing social assistance 
programmes over the past year, make it uncertain as to how effective and efficient 
the delivery of such assistance will be. 
In Brazil, Bolsonaro may have overplayed his hand. The opposition unified in 
response to government inaction, and sponsored an ambitious bill to provide a ba-
sic minimum income to close to half of the population. The bill provides a cash 
transfer that is equivalent to the 2018 urban per capita poverty level, and allows for 
it to be doubled for households with children (Blofield and Filgueira 2020). 
What stands out is the stinginess of South America’s richest country, Chile. A 
massive government economic rescue plan, representing 4.7 per cent of the coun-
try’s GDP, had little to directly offer the most vulnerable. In an already highly pri-
vatised system where employees (rather than employers) bear the brunt of social 
security payments, the opposition objected to the government’s anaemic assistance 
plans for vulnerable households. While the opposition managed to increase the ini-
tial amount and to ensure coverage for the bottom 60 per cent of the population, the 
subsidy is still equivalent to just 34 per cent of the 2018 national urban per capita 
poverty line and 76 per cent of the per capita extreme poverty line (Blofield and 
Filgueira 2020). President Piñera’s rock-bottom legitimacy following the massive 
social protests last October is now at 20 per cent, with the government acting just 
as its critics claim it does: with stunning tone-deafness to the needs of the majority, 
in a country that proudly joined the club of the Organisation for Economic Co-oper-
ation and Development recently and with one of the highest wealth concentrations 
in the world. 
Even Bolivia, South America’s poorest country, has stepped up more. In a bid 
to keep people off the streets in a country where 80 per cent of the economically ac-
tive population works in the informal sector for subsistence wages, the government 
promised a transfer equivalent to 60 perc ent of its 2018 urban per capita poverty 
line to Bolivia’s 2.2 million public-school children. It also promised emergency food 
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baskets to 1.6 million families (in a country of 11.5 million people) (Blofield and 
Filgueira 2020). 
In Colombia, the right-wing government has also moved to ensure emergency 
social assistance as it implements increasingly stringent social-distancing meas-
ures. It has promised aid to recipients of government programmes as well as fami-
lies in the informal sector. One group that has to date been left out in the cold are 
the over 1.6 million Venezuelan refugees in the country, the vast majority of whom 
are in the informal sector (Pardo 2020). The government rightfully claims that 
more international assistance is needed, but knowing where to place blame may be 
little comfort for refugees who cannot feed their families. 
The Looming Post-COVID-19 Economic Crisis
Beyond the disruptions from its own lockdown measures, Latin America will suf-
fer from external shocks. Demand for commodities will remain low, as long as the 
industrialised countries of the Global North remain in crisis mode. Oil exporting 
states such as Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, and Mexico, exporters of minerals 
such as Chile (copper) or of agricultural goods (think of Brazil’s soya) will see prices 
remain low as long as global demand is down. 
Moreover, migrant remittances – vital for Mexico and many Central American 
and Caribbean countries – can be expected to decline sharply as the crisis hits send-
ing countries. International tourism, a central pillar of many economies, has col-
lapsed and will take time to recover. In addition, the crisis has seen a massive capital 
flight from emerging markets and a depreciation of currencies in many countries. 
In the first month after the outbreak of the COVID-19 virus alone, Brazil suffered 
capital outflows worth USD 11,730 million (equivalent to the GDP of a country like 
Nicaragua); within a month the Real had lost 20 per cent on the US dollar.
So much, of course, depends on a return to economic growth. As elsewhere, 
the extent of the economic impact will depend on the duration of the – domestic 
and global – quarantine measures, making all forecasts “guesstimates” at best. The 
glimmer of hope is China, as the Asian superpower is leaving the lockdown phase 
and hopes to return soon to economic growth – crucial to cushioning the fall in 
global demand for Latin America’s exports. 
Where Help Is Coming From: The Shift in Global Geopolitics 
Indeed, in Latin America’s COVID-19 health emergency, the traditional “donor 
countries” in North America and Europe are likely to be of less help. By contrast, 
China has become a key actor in the region’s fight against the pandemic (notwith-
standing the fact that Bolsonaro, in line with Donald Trump’s rhetoric, seeks to 
label COVID-19 “the Chinese virus”). 
In fact, China has used the crisis to give an impressive display of its soft-power 
capacities as it sends face masks and test kits, protective medical gear, and ventila-
tors to Latin America (and to Africa as well as other world regions). While the pol-
itical gains Beijing seeks from this are evident, the aid China provides is magnified 
by the contrast with the absence of such practical help from the US and Europe – 
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both themselves currently in great need of these critical supplies. Even if seen as 
propaganda tools, in current circumstances they are highly welcomed by receiving 
countries. As a result, China is not only Latin America’s best hope to revive demand 
for exports but its medical help in these times of acute need will not fail to boost its 
public image across the continent.
The one Latin American country that is also engaged in foreign medical mis-
sions to fight the COVID-19 crisis, even if on a very different scale, is Cuba. The 
photos of the Cuban doctor brigade arriving in wealthy northern Italy forcefully 
contradict the usual perspective of North–South aid. For a long time, “medical in-
ternationalism” has been part of Cuba’s foreign policy and regime legitimacy (Hoff-
mann 2015). In the past two decades, it also evolved into a key revenue stream for 
the socialist state. Large contingents of Cuban medical personnel were deployed to 
Venezuela, Brazil, and Ecuador (the latter two cancelled after their left-wing gov-
ernments lost power). At the height of the projects, more than 50,000 healthcare 
workers from Cuba were working in 66 countries around the world. 
The direct precedent of Havana’s anti-COVID-19 brigades is the mission sent to 
fight the Ebola epidemic in Africa in 2014. Under the auspices of the World Health 
Organization (WHO), a group of 256 Cuban doctors, nurses, and other health pro-
fessionals was rapidly mobilised to provide “front-line” care in Sierra Leone, Libe-
ria, and Equatorial Guinea. As today the COVID-19 virus is threatening to overrun 
national health systems all over the world, Cuba’s medical missions are in high 
demand. Aside from the iconic brigade sent to Lombardy, Cuban medical person-
nel have also been sent to Angola and a dozen Caribbean states – from Suriname 
to the small islands of the West Indies. More destinations are likely to follow, and 
the WHO will probably seek again Cuban assistance to fight the pandemic on the 
African continent as well. 
Notwithstanding Cuba’s assistance to other countries, the COVID-19 pandemic 
has also put its own domestic health system to a severe test. After many years of 
crisis, the quality of Cuban hospital care is no longer what it used to be. Doctors are 
extremely low-paid (one reason why the much better paid work on missions abroad 
is so attractive), many medical materials are in short supply or cannot be come by, 
and sanitary conditions have become precarious for broad segments of the popula-
tion – with chronic deficiencies in the supply of tap water or body soap. 
The biggest challenge, however, stems from demography. Cuba has, together 
with Uruguay, the oldest population on the continent so that a full one-quarter of 
the population needs to be considered among the at-risk group. As the virus has 
started to spread exponentially, Cuba’s acclaimed healthcare system will face its 
most crucial test to date. Should the pandemic get out of control, it would take a 
high human toll. Also politically the stakes are high for the Cuban government, as 
the public health sector is the pride of the Revolution’s social achievements. 
For Cuba, this concrete aid in a humanitarian emergency represents an enor-
mous reputational gain in a moment where the Trump administration has stepped 
up its aggressive rhetoric aimed at isolating the Havana government. The medical 
missions will also provide the hard-currency earnings more desperately needed than 
ever. Over the past two years, Cuba’s economic situation has become more and more 
precarious. Now an even more profound economic crisis looms large, as Cuba – just 
as with other Caribbean countries – will face a disastrous tourism season and a 
sharp drop in remittances. The state’s reaction has been towards centralising eco-
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nomic decision-making and stepping up the rationing system. Whatever revenues 
the medical missions to fight COVID-19 might generate, they will fall short of pre-
venting Cuba from heading towards a profound economic crisis that has now al-
ready revived memories of the dramatic post-Soviet crisis years of the 1990s. 
Looking To the Future: A Role for Europe? 
In the next few weeks, government capacity will be tested in Latin America – as 
lockdowns are differentially respected and enforced, and with promises of emer-
gency social assistance needing to materialise in bank accounts, in cash transfers, 
and in food baskets. The epidemiological spread of COVID-19 will take place – with 
higher or with flatter curves – and health systems across the region will struggle to 
treat the severely affected. The different bets made by the “decisive actors” such as 
Fernández in Argentina and Vizcarra in Peru, versus the “denialist” strategies of 
Bolsonaro in Brazil and AMLO in Mexico, will play out. Miscalculations will invari-
ably be made, given the unprecedented and unfamiliar terrain we are dealing with. 
However, for leaders who use this moment to seek cooperation and unity across 
government and opposition, and with subnational entities, the blame game is likely 
to be much more limited. Although so much remains unforeseeable, such govern-
ments could emerge from the crisis politically strengthened. 
In international politics, while the US government is unable (and unwilling) 
to provide aid to the countries of the continent, in the wake of the COVID-19 crisis 
China is acquiring a more prominent public role in Latin America. These global 
geopolitical shifts are leaving Europe in an uncomfortable position, as it is absorbed 
by its own fight against the spread of the pandemic. Recent efforts to reach out 
to the region, such as Germany’s launch of a new Latin America and Caribbean 
Initiative last year, need to be continued despite the impending economic troubles 
and domestic woes. Aside from economic cooperation with robust social welfare 
institutions, Germany could collaborate with the social-assistance programmes that 
Latin American governments are setting up to guarantee basic incomes to the most 
vulnerable. Once the peak of the acute health emergency is overcome, Europe and 
Latin America will need strong multilateral initiatives to revive their ties in a world 
that has seen an unprecedented breakdown of global trade, travel, and coordina-
tion.
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